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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-1538 
____________ 
 
DAVID ARTURO AGUILAR, 
a/k/a DAVID ARTURO-AGUILAR, 
 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
           Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A200-765-683) 
Immigration Judge: Amit Chugh  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2016 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 David Arturo Aguilar (“Aguilar”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition 
for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
 Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without 
admission or parole.  On January 6, 2012, he was convicted in the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Union County, of the offense of aggravated assault, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-1(b)(1), a second degree felony, for which he was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of four (4) years.1  The Department of Homeland Security then sought his 
removal from the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an 
alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.  Aguilar appeared 
with counsel before an Immigration Judge and conceded that he is removable as charged.   
 Aguilar applied for statutory withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and 
for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  He claimed that he left El 
Salvador due to a fear that he would be harmed by members of Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-
13.  He alleged that his first encounter with the gang occurred in his hometown of 
Sensuntepeque when he was just 11 years old.  After being physically and 
psychologically abused for refusing to join them, Aguilar joined the gang when he was 
12 years old, and began stealing, extorting money, and dealing drugs.  He alleged that, in 
March 2004, he was attacked by gang members, apparently because he had disobeyed 
orders.  He went into hiding for a while and then crossed the border and went to live in 
                                              
1 Under § 2C:12-1(b)(1), a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “[a]ttempts to 
cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life 
recklessly causes such injury.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:12-1(b)(1).   
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Fresno, California with his mother.  There he picked fruits and vegetables.  He alleged 
that, eventually, he feared gang retaliation in Fresno itself and so he came to New Jersey.  
Aguilar’s sister submitted an affidavit on his behalf, corroborating a shooting incident in 
El Salvador, and Aguilar submitted country conditions evidence. 
 On August 26, 2015, the Immigration Judge determined that Aguilar’s crime was a 
“particularly serious crime” and thus that he was ineligible for withholding of removal 
under both the Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”), see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 
and the CAT, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4) and (d)(2).2  The IJ reasoned that, although 
Aguilar’s sentence was less than five (5) years and thus was not presumptively a 
“particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), the record of his 
conviction demonstrated that the crime was “particularly serious.”  Specifically, the 
Indictment stated that Aguilar did attempt to cause serious bodily injury to Junior 
Romales Perez, a minor, and/or, did recklessly cause serious bodily injury to Junior 
Romales Perez under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.  Moreover, the IJ concluded, the sentence imposed and the “egregious” facts 
and circumstances of the conviction also demonstrated that the crime was “particularly 
serious.” 
                                              
2 In support of this eligibility determination, the agency looks to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) of 
the INA, which provides that, although “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to 
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion,” id. at § 1231(b)(3)(A), an exception lies 
where the Attorney General decides that the alien has “been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime,” id. at § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Under the CAT, the 
agency looks to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16, which provides that, although an alien shall be 
granted withholding of removal where “the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in 
the country of removal,” id. at § 1208.16(c)(4), an exception lies for aliens who have 
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” id. at § 1208.16(d)(2). 
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 On October 26, 2015, the IJ denied Aguilar’s application for deferral of removal 
under the CAT.  After reviewing Aguilar’s testimony, affidavits in support of his 
application, and country conditions evidence, the IJ found that Aguilar generally was 
credible but denied him relief on the ground that he did not meet his burden of proof to 
show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured in El Salvador by or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a government official.  The IJ acknowledged Aguilar’s 
country conditions evidence showing the prevalence of violent gangs in El Salvador but 
reasoned that extensive gang violence alone did not show government involvement in 
what had happened to him.  The IJ ordered Aguilar’s removal to El Salvador. 
 Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Through counsel, Aguilar 
argued that, although under In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), a conviction 
does not have to be an aggravated felony to be considered a “particularly serious crime,” 
the IJ misapplied the factors identified in In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 
1982), for determining whether an alien whose sentence is less than five (5) years has 
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.”  A.R. 18.  Aguilar argued that, applying 
Frentescu to his conviction for aggravated assault, it was clear that he had not committed 
a “particularly serious crime” because the assault occurred only after he had attempted to 
separate two individuals who were fighting.  He reacted angrily only after one of those 
individuals turned on him.  A.R. 18, 21-23.  Aguilar argued, in addition, that he had met 
his burden of proof to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by 
gang members, and that government officials in El Salvador were accepting of MS-13’s 
activities.  A.R. 20. 
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 On February 28, 2016, the Board dismissed the appeal.  The Board agreed with the 
IJ that Aguilar’s crime was a “particularly serious crime” that made him ineligible for 
withholding of removal under either the INA or the CAT.  The Board noted the elements 
of § 2C:12-1(b)(1), and noted that Aguilar had conceded in his Form I-589 application 
that he had, in fact, caused injury to the victim.  Citing Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 
F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2011), the Board observed that crimes entailing the use or threat of 
force tend to be regarded as “particularly serious.”  In addition, the Board remarked that 
Aguilar’s four-year sentence reflected the seriousness of his crime.  Accordingly, the 
Board concluded that Aguilar was only eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.  
The Board then found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Aguilar failed to meet 
his burden of proof to show that, if returned to El Salvador, he will experience treatment 
that would rise to the level of torture that is “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).3 
 Aguilar petitioned for review, and moved in this Court for a stay of removal.  The 
Attorney General moved to dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.  A 
motions panel of this Court denied Aguilar a stay of removal and referred the Attorney 
General’s motion to dismiss to a merits panel.  Briefing ensued and the petition for 
review is ripe for disposition.  In his pro se brief, Aguilar argues that the IJ’s decision to 
deny him relief under the CAT is not supported by substantial evidence.  Based on the 
                                              
3 The IJ also made an alternative determination that he would not grant withholding of 
removal in any event because Aguilar did not show membership in a cognizable 
particular social group.  The Board found it unnecessary to reach the merits of this 
alternative determination, agreeing with the IJ that Aguilar’s crime was “particularly 
serious” and thus that he is only eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.  
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Aguilar’s failure to raise any colorable legal or constitutional contentions, the Attorney 
General has renewed her motion to dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
 We will grant the Attorney General’s motion and dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Generally, the INA prohibits us from reviewing a final order of removal 
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense 
covered in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (precluding jurisdiction 
to review final orders of removal against aliens who are removable for having been 
convicted of criminal offenses listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)).  Section 1252(a)(2)(C) 
generally eliminates judicial review of final orders of removal against aliens like Aguilar, 
who are removable by reason of having committed a crime involving moral turpitude.  
See Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 102-03 (3d Cir 2006).  Aguilar has waived 
and failed to exhaust any argument that his conviction is not a crime involving moral 
turpitude by conceding removability as charged, failing to raise this issue before the 
Board, and failing to raise any argument in his pro se brief on appeal concerning this 
issue.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (issue waived where not 
raised in brief on appeal); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (court may review final order of removal 
only where alien has exhausted all administrative remedies).  
 Notwithstanding this jurisdictional limitation, we retain jurisdiction to review 
colorable constitutional claims and questions of law that are raised in the petition for 
review.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  A challenge to a denial of withholding of removal 
based on ineligibility per se presents a reviewable question of law, Alaka, 456 F.3d at 
104, but Aguilar’s brief raises no reviewable issue in this regard.  He has raised what 
amounts to a disagreement with the agency’s factual determination that he failed to 
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sufficiently demonstrate that public officials in El Salvador would likely acquiesce in his 
torture, and this argument is unreviewable.  See Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011).  To the extent that Aguilar argues that the 
agency failed to consider evidence related to the government of El Salvador’s willful 
blindness or acquiescence, see Petitioner’s Brief at 12-20, he has failed to identify any 
specific evidence that the agency allegedly overlooked. 
 Furthermore, we see no merit to any argument that the Board misapplied its 
precedent to the “particularly serious crime” determination, to the extent that such an 
argument has been made.4  The governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), “contains no 
limiting language restricting the Attorney General’s discretion to label crimes as 
particularly serious and the long history of case-by-case determination of particularly 
serious crimes counsels against attempts to craft a bright-line rule.”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 
214 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).5  Where the elements of 
the conviction in question “suggest that the crime could potentially qualify as particularly 
serious,” the Board does “‘not prohibit the examination of other evidence or indicate that 
only conviction records and sentencing information’” may be used.  Id. at 215 (quoting In 
re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344).  In short, “the categorical approach, used primarily in 
determining removability,” does not apply.  Id.  The Board generally examines a variety 
                                              
4 We held in Alaka, 456 F.3d at 104, that a crime must be an aggravated felony to be 
considered a “particularly serious crime.”  The agency did not address whether Aguilar’s 
crime was an aggravated felony, notwithstanding our express holding in Alaka, because 
in In re M-H-, 26 I. & N. 26 (BIA 2012), the Board held that it would apply its contrary 
holding in In re N-A-M- (that an alien’s crime need not be an aggravated felony to be 
considered a “particularly serious crime”) to cases arising in this circuit, in order to 
promote national uniformity.  Despite the Board’s decision, we decline to address or 
reevaluate Alaka here because the issue was neither raised nor briefed by the parties. 
5 In Denis, we determined that the alien’s conviction qualified as an aggravated felony, 
633 F.3d at 213.  
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of factors and does not exclude otherwise reliable information from consideration.  Id.  
Moreover, the Board generally categorizes crimes against persons as “particularly 
serious,” see In re L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 (BIA 1999).  Based on the elements of 
§ 2C:12-1(b)(1), the Form I-589 admission, and the substantial four-year sentence, 
Aguilar’s second-degree aggravated assault crime indisputably was “particularly serious” 
under Board precedent. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Attorney General’s motion and 
dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
